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Abstract In this paper, we provide practical decision support to managers in firms involved in Industrial 
Symbiotic Relations (ISRs) in terms of strategy development and test the hypothesis that in the long-term, playing 
a fair strategy for sharing obtainable ISR-related benefits is dominant. We employ multi-agent-based simulations 
and model industrial decision-makers as interacting agents that observe their history of cooperation decisions in 
ISRs. The agents are able to: learn from their past, deviate from relations in which their partner plays unfair, and 
change their strategy to reach higher long-term benefits. Results show that in a long-run, industrial decision 
makers learn to play fair in ISRs. In addition to managerial support for developing long-lasting ISRs, our work 
introduces the concept of learning as a notion that links the micromotives in ISRs to their macrobehavior. 
Keywords: Industrial Symbiotic Relations, Strategy Management, Learning in Industrial Relations, Industrial 
Symbiosis Evolution, Multiagent-Based Simulation 
1. Introduction 
To improve the implementability of Circular Economy (CE) in the industrial context, providing 
practical insights about Industrial Symbiotic Relations (ISRs) and their evolution fosters the shift 
from CE in theory to practice as it supports industrial decision-makers while getting engaged in 
ISRs. For such a purpose, understanding the long-term behavior of ISRs aids the decision makers 
learn about the effects of different strategies applicable for sharing obtainable ISR-related 
benefits. Accordingly, this work is focused on the long-term behavior of industrial agents and the 
evolution of cooperation decisions in ISRs. In such relations, two possible fair and unfair benefit-
sharing strategies are taken into account. Applying a fair strategy implies that the firm is available 
to obtain a minimum acceptable benefit value while an unfair firm takes the major part of ISR-
related obtainable benefits, which might be triggered by several reasons such as power asymmetry 
between companies, market image or existence of governmental regulations. Considering these 
strategies, we test the hypothesis that in the long-term, firms learn to implement the fair strategy. 
The rationale is that in case a firm 𝐴𝐴 applies the unfair strategy, in the long-term other firms that 
are in relation with 𝐴𝐴 learn that they can benefit more by defecting the relation (and joining other 
relations). Such collapses of relations are costly for 𝐴𝐴 as it has to establish new ISRs and pay 
corresponding costs. This approach captures the path dependence phenomena and organizational 
learning processes in the context of industrial symbiosis [1,2]. 
2. Methods 
We test our hypothesis using multi-agent-based simulations. In particular, we simulate multi-
round games among industrial agents. The generic 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ agent is provided with the following three 
parameters: 1) 𝜋𝜋(𝑖𝑖) represents the probability that 𝑖𝑖 plays the fair strategy when starting a new 
game; 2) 𝜓𝜓(𝑖𝑖) represents the probability that, if at time 𝑡𝑡 − 1 the agent 𝑖𝑖 and its partner were 
cooperating, both of them playing the fair strategy, at time 𝑡𝑡 the agent 𝑖𝑖 changes its strategy and 
plays the unfair strategy; 3) 𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖) represents the probability that agent 𝑖𝑖 interrupts its current 
relationship because it is playing the fair strategy and its partner is playing the unfair strategy. We  
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consider 100 resource-provider firms and 100 resource-receiver firms interacting with each other 
for 600 runs. At the end of the simulation, we collect: 1) the average value of 𝜋𝜋. The higher this 
value, the more firms learned the fair play in ISRs; 2) the average value of 𝜒𝜒 which is about agents 
learning that they can gain greater economic benefits by breaking the relationship with unfair 
partners; and 3) the average value of 𝜓𝜓. The higher this value, the more firms learned that 
opportunistic behaviors stemming from changing from fair to unfair strategy when the partner is 
playing the fair strategy is detrimental for long-term ISRs. Simulations are replicated 10000 times 
to give statistically significant results. All values are averaged across the replications. 
3. Results 
Simulation results are shown in Figure 1. In particular, Figure 1-Left shows the values of 𝜋𝜋, 𝜓𝜓, and 
𝜒𝜒 for resource-provider firms whereas Figure 1-Right shows the values for resource-receiver firms.  
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of ISR parameters 𝜋𝜋, 𝜓𝜓, and 𝜒𝜒 for resource-providers (Left) and resource-receivers (Right). 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
First, we can note similarities between corresponding values for resource receivers and providers 
(e.g. 𝜋𝜋(𝐴𝐴) and 𝜋𝜋(𝐵𝐵)). These similarities are because we have considered the ISRs as a form of 
symmetric relations and mainly focused on the temporal behavior of ISRs. Our results show that in 
the long-term, playing fair strategies increases the probability that an ISR arises. Moreover, firms learn 
that the opportunistic behavior (i.e. aiming to take more advantage from existing ISRs) is detrimental 
for their economic results. These results are in line with the literature highlighting the key role of 
collaboration for the success of the IS practice [3]. In addition to managerial decision support to 
industrial firms and suggesting the implementation of fair strategies in ISRs, we contribute to 
theoretical understanding of the relation between motives of individual industrial agents and the 
failure/establishment of long-term relations. We show that the macro-level behavior of ISRs (e.g., 
simultaneous emergence of multiple ISRs and their evolution) is not simply the aggregation of micro-
level motives, e.g., to maximize the benefits regardless of the opponent's benefits (see [4]). Our results 
show that the ability of industrial decision-makers to learn, from their past experiences, bridges ISR 
micromotives to macrobehaviors and explains the dominance of fair ISRs in the long-term. This is, in a 
long-run, agents learn to play fair in ISRs. 
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